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Das Internationale Civil und Handelsrecht auf Grund der Theorie,
Gesetzebung und Praxis. By F. Meili, Zurich, 19o2. Inter-
national Civil and Commercial Law, etc., by F. Meili. Trans-
lated and Supplemented with additions of American and
English Law. by Arthur K. Kuhn. The MacMillan Com-
pany, New York, 1905.
Das Internationale Civilprozessrecht auf Grund der Theorie,
Gesetzebung und Praxis. By F. Meili. Parts I and II.
Zurich, 19o4.
Professor Meili, in these volumes, treats of whatever belongs
to Private International Law, (or as he prefers to call it, Interna-
tional Private Law), considered with reference to civil relations,
in two aspects. The first work deals with substantive righti; the
last describes remedial procedure. Each shows wide reading and
close thought.
Dr. Meili has been a prolific author of late years, and this may
account for a certain incompleteness of statement which is some-
times noticeable. Thus in the volume devoted to substantive law
he begins by observing that the problems to be solved are approach-
ed in any country in two directions, namely, that which views the
obligations of foreigners and that which views the obligations of
its own citizens in foreign lands. The third point of view-that
concerning the rights growing out of foreign transactions, whether
the parties to it be aliens or citizens-is left here unnoticed. It
is nevertheless, as is fully recognized later in the work (Sec. 34
et seq.), the main and controlling point of view, according to the
doctrines of modern political science, as formulated by Savigny
and repeated or re-phrased by von Bar and Schaffner.
The author does not mince words in discussing opposing
theories. The positions of Pitter and Pfeifer for instance as to
the lex fori are contemptuously passed by with the remark that both
treated in a careless manner a topic that neither understood nor
sought to understand.
As to the question whether national law or that of the domicil
should be adopted, as the ordinary test of personal rights, Dr.
Meili, following lines indicated in his address before the St. Louis
points to the policy and institutions of Congress of Jurists in i9O4,
his country as indicating a via media. As to some objects he would
accept the one; as to others the other (Sec. 45). To apply it to
every case would, he thinks, be to bring back the system of legal
chaos obtaining in the dark ages, when five men might live in the
same place, each subject to a different law and yet subject to the
same sovereign (Sec. i7).
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
He has no patience with the sciolists who would aim at the
general unification of the laws of different countries. On a few
subjects they can be the same. On most it is enough to settle
which of several differing laws shall be applied to a particular case.
The work of the Hague Conferences of 1893, 1894 and 19oo in this
direction is described at some lengths and contrasted with the
comparatively abortive attempts of South American Congresses of
a similar character-abortive because insisting too strongly on
absolute uniformity. In saying, however, that the treaties framed
by that held at Montevideo in 1889 were only ratified by Uruguay,
he is in error. Before the close of 1894 they had also been ratified
by Peru, Paraguay and the Argentine Republic. The text of the
three Hague treaties on marriage, divorce and guardianship, which
are now in force between ten European powers, is given in the
appendix to Mr. Kuhn's translation.
The latter has done his work with care, and very creditably,
in view of .the difficulties to be encountered. Occasionally a harsh
term creeps in which hardly carries the author's thought, as where
(Sec. 15) the jus gentium is said to represent a complex of strange
views of private law; "strange" being here an infelicitous substi-
tution for "foreign." So an attempt to reduce to a word the
description of a complicated subject sometimes tends to obscurity,
as where (Sec. 66) reference is made to the great liberty accorded
by England and America to foreign corporations as to entering
"into legal relations in the internal state; "internal" being here
used to denote the country (being foreign to the corporation)
which is the seat of the transaction, or possibly (cf. p. 546) the lex
fori. A few errors in proof revision are to be regretted, as where
(p. 228) "changeableness" is used where "unchangeableness" was
intended.
Discriminating citations of American authorities added by
Mr. Kuhn are incorporated in the text of his translation, and with
their aid the work will be a useful manual to American students.
It avoids the diffuseness of many writers on this subject, and
its propositions are generally both clear and compact. A valuable
feature is the concise statements of the positions taken by leading
authors, and by congresses and learned societies, down to the open-
ing year of the present century. In revising Mr. Kuhn's work, Dr.
Meili has taken the opportunity to refer in this manner to much that
has been done and published in 1903 and 19o4.
The latest of these books, that treating of Civilprozessrecht,
proceeds on a less traveled path, and may be said to be a supple-
ment to the other. It is a hand-book of practice in three parts,
for the lawyer who has to prosecute a claim abroad or to present
before the courts of his own country one arising out of a foreign
transaction. Such remedies as might be open to him are described
at length, with relation to mesne process, jurisdidtion, pleadings,
evidence, judgment and execution. The first part deals .with
general considerations; the second with particulars; and the third
(not yet published) is to be confined to final judgment and process.
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The author cites an important decision (p. 35) of the court of
appeals at Rome, given in 1881, to effect that treaties become the
law of each of the contracting powers and magistrates have full
right to recognize their effect when they are invoked in the sup-
port of private rights. This, for Italy, puts a treaty by judicial
construction where our own Constitution puts it in express
terms. It is a reasonable deduction from the modern practice re-
quiring parliamentary ratification of treaties, which now prevails
generally in Europe.
Considerable space is given to methods of extra-territorial ser-
vice of process by the aid of foreign judicial officers, a proceeding
analogous to that upon a rogatory commission. The treaties be-
tween various European powers as to jurisdiction of suits affecting
foreigners, whether natural or artificial persons, are described at
length, as well as the provisions of their codes. International arbi-
tration receives ample consideration (Sec. 44).
A part of the book which is of special practical importance to
American lawyers is the discussion of the rules affecting written
evidence produced from abroad (Sec. 561, et seq.). There is a
certain trend of Continental European opinion towards giving it
such weight as it would be entitled to within the jurisdiction from
which it comes, but the Institute of International Law, in resolu-
tions cited by the author and adopted in 1898, while accepting this
rule as to matters of form, favored the lex fori as the standard
of probative force.
No lawyer can ever safely assume the conduct of a cause in a
foreign country. He must rely on local counsel for the ultimate
direction of its course; but a book like that under review will help
him greatly, both in giving advice to such an associate and in
understanding advice given by him. It is a good guidepost, and
it is good to have guideposts as well as guides.
S.E.B.
Roman Water Law. Translated from the Pandects of Justinian.
By E. F. Ware, of the Topeka Bar. The West Publishing Co.,
St. Paul, Minn. Half morocco, pages, i6o.
This is an interesting monograph on the subject of the Roman
law concerning fresh water. It is composed of excerpta from the
Corpus uris Civilis (particularly the Digest), which bear in any
way upon this subject. Primarily it is a translation of these
excerpta, which have been literally translated with care. This
material from the Roman law has been arranged by the author in
the following topics: rivers, rain water, springs, drip, waterworks,
sewers, reservoirs, irrigation, water-rights, right of way and the
appropriate remedies and procedure of the civil laws as to the same.
It is an advantageous contribution to the literature in English or
Roman law.
It is supplemented by the Spanish law on the same subject as
found in the Siete Partidas, which was their law when America was
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discovered and which underlies the modern Mexican law on this
subject. Students of legal history in Louisiana and certain of the
southwestern states should welcome this addition of the author
to the proper scope of his work.
The author's introduction of fifteen pages is an ambitious
effort. It notices the point of contact between certain American
states and the civil law, discusses the codification of the Roman
law by the Emperor Justinian, and gives some interesting data as
to the possible influence of Assyrian, Persian and Egyptian law,
on Roman water lay. Furthermore, it contains what is found in
the works of the French civilian Domat and in the French Civil
Code, relative to the same subject, a feature which would have come
more logically in the supplemental posterior portion of the book.
-C. P. S.
Cases on Domestic Relations and the Law of Persons. Second
edition. By Edwin H. Woodruff, Professor of Law at Cornell
University. Baker, Voorhees & Co., New York. Art canvas,
pages XV, 624.
The compilation of a satisfactory case-book upon the law of
Domestic Relations is attended by peculiar and exceptional diffi-
culties by reason of the changeable state of the law and the chaotic
condition of the decisions by which the compiler is confronted.
Professor Woodruff achieved an enviable degree of success by the
first edition of his work and now, after an interval of eight years,
we are favored with a new edition differing from the first chiefly
in the recent decisions which are inserted to the extent of a hundred
additional pages and numerous additional notes. These new cases
add materially to the value of the entire work and the notes, while
they are mostly brief, are very satisfactory. The author in his very
brief preface calls special attention to the fact that a group of cases
on conflict of jurisdiction in divorce cases has been added, but an
examination of these cases indicates that, in this instance, Professor
Woodruff has been less fortunate than usual in his selection of
decisions. No mention whatever is made of that remarkable series
of cases decided by the Supreme Court in i9oi, beginning with*
Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155. On the other hand, space is
given to People v. Baker, 76 N. Y., 78, which is practically over-
ruled by the Supreme Court in Atherton v. Atherton. No student
should be allowed to complete his study of Domestic Relations with-
out having had a brief opportunity to gain an accurate knowledge
of the law as established in these cases by our court of last resort.
Aside from this regrettable omission, Professor Woodruff's book
commends itself to every student and will also prove of universal
value to the practitioner.
B.E.C.
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Wills on Circumstantial Evidence. Fifth Edition. By Sir Alfred
Wills, Knt. American notes by Professors George E.
Beers and Arthur L. Corbin of the Faculty of the Yale Law
School. The Boston Book Company, Boston, Mass., 1905 .
Sheep, pages, 448. (American Notes, 239.)
Wills on Circumstantial Evidence is an exposition of the
fascinating parts of the criminal law. Many of the cases digested
and used for illustration remind one rather of the stories of Poe
and Doyle than of a technical work-so much the more interesting
because of their truth. Of course these cases are the pick of a
century-the confession without guilt, or the case minutely perfect
made out by the prosecution only to be controverted by an un-
impeachable alibi are phenomena to be observed not more than once
in the life of any man-but they make one forget the daily routine
of pettiness, of sordidness, and of filth, which gains for the practice
of criminal law so universal disfavor and which repels most of the
greater lawyers. Without regard to its technical merits, but merely
for the human interest of the cases, the book is well worth reading.
The American notes, though containing fewer pages, are in
much finer print than the text and since the digests of cases are
more brief, they actually cover rather more ground. Some of the
American cases are given in detail and are of great interest, especi-
ally those like that of the Chicago Anarchists, Molineaux and Prof.
Webster. No table of cases, however, is cited which is rather detri-
mental, we think, to the general utility. The present writer sought
in vain for the case of Martin Thorne and H. H. Holmes in the
American notes, though possibly some mention is made of them,
which he overlooked. But both for analogy and reference the
book, and especially the American notes, ought, to those who have
the opportunity and inclination .to undertake the great cases of the
criminal law, where usually the circumstantial is the only evidence
obtainable, to be of great value.
G.S. A.
Jurisprudence, Law, and Ethics. By Edgar B. Kinkead, M. A.,
Professor of Law, Ohio State University. The Banks Law
Publishing Co., New York, 19o5. Buckram, pages, 357.
This work consists of a collection of lectures prepared for the
class room. It is an introduction of primary and fundamental
principles. They are set out tersely, almost epigrammatically,
leaving the reader plenty of opportunity for individual speculation.
The author does not attempt to treat the subject of jurisprudence
and ethics from any original standpoint, but is content in introduc-
ing us to what the great minds of continental Europe, England and
America have thought, quoting freely from their works. The
science of law, its fundamental basis and its relation to other
sciences is displayed, and its objects set forth. In part II the pro-
fessional relation of the lawyer to the bench, his fellow members of
the bar and his client is discussed. Lawyers as well as students
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should find this part of the work useful and interesting. Too
much cannot be said on professional ethics. Such works as this,
together with more stringent requirements for admission to the bar
in several states should help raise the moral standards of the
American lawyer. M4,S. W.
American Railroad Rates. By Walter C. Noyes. Little, Brown &
Co., Boston. 19o5. Cloth, pages 277.
This volume contains a clear, clean cut exposition of the
present railroad problem,-federal regulation of rates. In the
early chapters the author, treating the basal principles of rate
making, classification, tariffs, discriminations, competition and
combination, and movements of rates, sets forth the evils result-
ing from regulation of rates by railroad officials. The last two
chapters consider the expediency of governmental regulation of
rates and the inadequacy of existing federal legislation.
The Interstate Commerce Commission Act in its provision
for the regulation of rates is merely declaratory of the common
law rule that all rates shall be reasonable. Congress has not
given the commission power to complete the remedy by prescrib-
ing a reasonable rate to supersede one found to be unreasonable.
Maximum Rate Case, 167 U. S. 512. Thus the power of the com-
mission ceases at the vital point. The present problem, there-
fore, is to provide a constitutional and effectual plan for declaring
authoritatively that a rate is unreasonable and also what rate
should be substituted therefor. In effect, the remedies generally
proposed provide that the existing law should be amended to
give the present commission this latter additional power, e. g., the
Esch-Townsend Bill, which haspassed the House of Representa-
tives and awaits the action of the Senate.
The author strongly opposes these proposed remedies as un-
constitutional in that they confer judicial and legislative powers
upon the same body. He places much reliance on the following
extract from the Maximum Rate Case, supra: "It is one thing
to enquire whether the rates which have been collected are rea-
sonable-that is a judicial act-but an entirely different thing to
prescribe-rates which shall be charged in the future, that is a leg-
islative act." In passing it is well to not ^ that this queftion is
still res ntegra, since the above statement is clearly dictum, the
question before the court in that case being merely whether Con-
gress had as a matter of fact given the existing commission power
to prescribe future rates, not whether such a grant by Congress
would be unconstitutional. The court said: "Our conclusion,
then, is that Congress has not conferred upon the commission the
legislative power of prescribing rates." (p. 512).
To avoid this constitutional objection the author proposes
the following plan:
"First: A special court should be created in accordance
with the constitutional provision concerning the federal judiciary.
Complaints made by persons. aggrieved or in their behalf by a
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public official or board, that specific railroad rates upon interstate
traffic are unreasonable and unjust should be presented to this
court. After speedy notice to the carrier the court should sum-
marily inquire into the reasonableness of the rates complained of.
If found reasonable, the complaint should be dismissed; if found
unreasonable, the court should enjoin its further collection. This
would end the function of the court.
Second: In case a rate was found unreasonable all the
papers in the case, together with the evidence, should be certified
to the Interstate Commerce Commission, which should be em-
powered, upon an inspection of the papers, then to make a maxi-
mum rate to take the place of that found unreasonable by the
court. The rate prescribed should remain in force a prescribed
time, but should be subject to modification by the commission."
(p. 255).
This scheme is ingenious and its constitutionality is beyond
question. Yet, however constitutional a scheme it may be it is
of no avail if impracticable. The following reasons seem sufficient
to show the difficulty of a practical application of the author's
scheme and to establish the necessity of conferring upon one
body authority to declare that a rate is unreasonable and also
what rate should be substituted therefor.
I. The second body might not have sufficient evidence be-
fore it to enable it to determine the reasonable rate. By the
author's plan this body is to consider only the evidence before the
first tribunal. The only question before this body being the
reasonableness of the rate complained of, evidence bearing on this
point only would be admissible. In case the rate complained of
is palpably unreasonable it would be unnecessary for the first
tribunal, in determining that the charge is unreasonable, to go
through the process of determining *the exactly reasonable rate.
Says the author, "The courts might enjoin the collection of one
dollar as an unreasonable charge. There would be no necessity
for determining whether eighty or ninety cents would be unreas-
able." (p 254). Evidence of the latter fact would not be essen-
tial to the former conclusion.
II. In case of a close question as to the unreasonableness of
the charge it would undoubtedly be necessary for the first tribu-
nal to adopt some standard of reasonableness for purposes of
comparison. Of course a standard would have to be adopted by
the second body in all cases. There is no certainty that both
bodies would adopt the same standard.
Some conception of the difficulty of fixing a proper standard
and of the broad field for honest differences of opinion may be
had from the following language of the Supreme Court in the
Freight Association Cuse, z66 U S. 331: "What is the proper
standard by which to judge the fact of reasonable rates? Must
the rate be so high as to enable the return for the whole business
done to amount to a sum sufficient to afford a shareholder a fair
and reasonable profit? If so, what is a fair and reasonable profit?
That depends sometimes upon the risk incurred, and as the rate
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itself differs in different localities, which is the one to which refer-
ence is to be made as the standard? Or is the reasonableness of
the profit to be limited to a fair return upon the capital that
would have been sufficient to build and equip the road, if honestly
expended? Or, is still another standard to be created, and the
reasonableness of the charges tried by the cost of a carriage of
the article and a reasonable profit allowed on that? And in such
case would contribution to a sinking fund to make repairs be as-
sumed as a proper item? Or is the reasonableness of the charge
to be tested by reference to the charges for the transportation of
the same kind of property made by other roads similarly situated?
It is quite apparent, therefore, that it is exceedingly difficult to
formulate even the terms of the rule itself which should govern
in the matter of determining what would be reasonable rates for
transportation."
In the opinion of the author "The only way is to base
charges upon ability to pay. But in measuring ability and differ-
ences in ability there is no definite rule to go by. The method
is so flexible and elastic that there is much room for honest dif-
ferences of opinion as to the precise point where the rate should
be fixed." (p. 236). In Tift v. Southern Ry. Co. 138 Fed. 753, the
United States Circuit Court repudiates this rule of "charging
what the tariff will bear."
Even if a proper standard were agreed upon there might
arise a difference of opinion regarding its application. Thus a
rate declared unreasonable by the first body might be found to be
reasonable by the second body.
Nor do we think the author's objection to combining these
powers in one tribunal well taken. That legislative, executive
and judical functions should not be exercised by one body is a
maxim of political science. It may be well to note that Montes-
quieu, if not the parent, the foster parent of this precept, in say-
ing, "There can be no liberty if the power of judging be not
separated from the executive and legislative powers," Srit of
Laws, Bk. XI C. 6, meant, as his own words indicate, especially
when viewed in the light of the example before him, the English
Constitution, considered by him "The Mirror of Political Liber-
ty," that the same hands that possess the whole power of one de-
partment should not exercise the whole power of another depart-
ment. Further on in this chapter he provides that the prefer-
ment of charges of impeachment and trial of the same should be
in the hands of the legislature and that "the executive power
should have a share in the legislature by the power of rejecting."
It is unnecessary to call attention to the numerous exceptions to
the maxim made by the federal and state constitutions. Besides
these exceptions there are many others based on the solid ground
of public convenience and practical necessity. The courts exer-
cise legislative power in prescribing rules of procedure, evidence,
etc.
Of necessity these great functions of government overlap
each other and involve in their execution many incidental pow-
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ers common to all, though in their intrinsic character more natur-
ally within the scope of one department. Investigation of facts
precedent to action is an essential attribute of both departments.
The mere fact that the method of conducting the investigation
adopted by the legislature is similar to that used by judicial tri-
bunals does not constitute an unconstitutional encroachment upon
the prerogative of the judiciary. The ultimatepurpose for which,
not the method by which, the investigation is conducted deter-
mines the character of the function exercised. The court inves-
tigates the facts to enable it to exercise its exclusive functions of
applying existing rules of law and affording a remedy to the in-
jured party or inflicting a punishment. The legislature investi-
gates the past and present conditions to enable it to exercise its
exclusive prerogative of determining the expediency of a change
in the law and what particular change should bc instituted. The
power to determine the reasonableness of an existing rate is an
incidental power necessarily common to both the legislative and
judicial departments as such is merely investigation precedent to
action. W. U. Tel. Co. v. Afyaft, 97 Fed. 335, 345. As an illus-
tration of this we may take the author's provision that, "the rate
prescribed should be subject to modification." (p. 256). By whom
is the fact to be determined that a modification of the rate pre-
scribed by the commission has become necessary by reason
of a change of circumstances? The author says "by the commis-
sion." This is so for the courts could not interfere unless the
rate prescribed by the commission were confiscatory. When the
rate "has been properly fixed, the legislature and not the courts
must be appealed to for the change." Pedk v. Chicago Rd. Co., 94
U. S. z78. Would not the author's objection to combining the
functions of the two departments apply here? It would be neces-
sary forthe commission to determine whether the rates which
had been collected were unreasonable and to prescribe "rates
which should be charged in the future."
C.H.H.
